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Abstract 
  This paper examines price-setting duopoly games with production subsidies and shows 
that the optimal production subsidy, profits and economic welfare are identical 
irrespective of whether (i) a public firm and a private firm simultaneously and 
independently set prices, (ii) the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) both 
firms behave as profit-maximizers. 
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1. Introduction 
  The analysis by White (1996) investigates the role that production subsidies play in a 
quantity-setting mixed market and how they may influence the privatization decision. He 
presents the following three main results. First, if subsidies are used before and after 
privatization, then privatization does not change economic welfare. Second, if subsidies 
are used only before privatization, then privatization always lowers economic welfare. 
Third, the subsidy contributes to overall efficiency in a mixed market due to cost 
distribution effects. Poyago-Theotoky (2001) shows that the optimal production subsidy 
is identical irrespective of whether (i) a public firm moves simultaneously with n private 
firms, (ii) it acts as a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) all firms behave as profit-maximizers. In 
addition, Ohnishi (2012) considers the role that production subsidies play in a Bertrand 
mixed market and shows that the results are the same as those of Cournot mixed market 
games. 
  We study the role that production subsidies play in a price-setting duopoly comprising 
a public firm and a private firm. We consider the following three regimes: (i) the public 
firm moves simultaneously with the private firm, (ii) the public firm acts as a Stackelberg 
leader, and (iii) both firms behave as profit-maximizers. We solve and compare the three 
games. 
  The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. 
Section 3 presents the result of this study. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Model 
  Let us consider a model composed of a welfare-maximizing public firm and a 
profit-maximizing private firm producing imperfectly substitutable goods. In the 
remainder of this paper, subscripts 0 and 1 denote the public firm and the private firm, 
respectively. In addition, when i  and j  are used to refer to firms in an expression, they 
should be understood to refer to 0 and 1 with i j . There is no possibility of entry or 
exit. On the consumption side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type whose 
utility function is linear. Following Barcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2007), we assume that the 
representative consumer maximizes 0 1 0 0 1 1( , )U q q p q p q , where iq  denotes the 
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amount of good i  and ip  is its price. The function 0 1( , )U q q  is quadratic, strictly 
concave and symmetric in 0q  and 1q : 
2 2
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1( , ) ( ) ( 2 ) / 2U q q a q q q bq q q , 
where 0a  and 0 1b . The demand function is given by 
  
2
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i j
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a b p bp
q
b
,                                               (1) 
where b  denotes a measure of the degree of substitutability among products. 
  Each firm’s profit is given by 
  ( )i i ip c s q ,                                                 (2) 
where c  denotes the total cost for each unit of output and s  is the subsidy for each unit 
of output. We assume 0 c a  to assure that the production levels of firms are positive. 
Economic welfare, defined as the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus, is given 
by 
  0 1 0 1( )W CS s q q ,                                          (3) 
where 2 2 20 0 1 1 0 1[ 2 2 (1 )( )] / 2(1 )CS p bp p p a b a p p b . We use subgame 
perfection as the equilibrium concept. 
 
 
3. Main result 
  In this section, we consider the following three price-setting regimes: (a) mixed market, 
(b) private market, and (c) Stackelberg mixed market. 
 
(a) Mixed market 
  There are two stages: in the first stage the government sets the production subsidy to 
maximize economic welfare; in the second stage both firms simultaneously and 
independently choose their prices conditional on the production subsidy. The game is 
solved by backward induction to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium. Maximizing (2) 
and (3) simultaneously, we arrive at the second-stage equilibrium prices in terms of s : 
  0 2
(1 ) (2 )
2
N ab b c b bsp
b
,   
2
1 2
(1 ) (1 )
2
N a b c b b sp
b
.             (4) 
  We now solve the first stage of the game. In the first stage, taking into account how 
firms will react to the subsidy, the government determines the welfare-maximizing 
subsidy: 
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.                                            (5) 
Since a c , *s  is strictly positive, so that the government will always grant a positive 
subsidy. 
  From (4) and (5), we derive the following subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes: 
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,                                      (6) 
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  Note that each firm sets a price that equals c . 
 
(b) Private market 
  In stage one, the government decides the production subsidy to maximize economic 
welfare; in stage two, both firms simultaneously and independently choose their prices 
conditional on the production subsidy. The game is solved by backward induction to 
obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium. Maximizing (2) simultaneously, we obtain the 
second-stage equilibrium in terms of s : 
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p s
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.                                   (11) 
  In stage one, taking into account how firms will react to the subsidy, the government 
determines the welfare-maximizing subsidy. It happens that the optimal subsidy, prices, 
outputs, profits, consumer surplus and economic welfare in this case are identical with 
those in the Bertrand mixed market. Therefore, expressions (6) – (10) also represent the 
relevant expressions for the subsidized private market. 
 
(c) Stackelberg mixed market 
  We now consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the government 
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chooses the production subsidy. In the second stage, the public firm chooses its price. In 
the third stage, the private firm chooses its price. Starting from the third stage, we obtain 
  00
(1 )
( , )
2
a b c s bp
p p s .                                        (12) 
  In the second stage, the public firm decides its price for given subsidy anticipating how 
its choice affects the private firm’s price decision. This results in 
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,              (13) 
and further we obtain 
2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 2 2
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  In the first stage, the government anticipating how its choice of subsidy affects firms’ 
price choices, maximizes (3). The optimal subsidy is 
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. 
Prices, outputs, profits, consumer surplus and economic welfare are identical to those 
obtained in (a) and (b), i.e. given by expressions (6) – (10). 
  Now we can state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In a price-setting model with production subsidization, the optimal 
subsidy is identical irrespective of whether (i) the public firm moves simultaneously with 
the private firm, (ii) the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) both firms behave 
as profit-maximizers. 
 
  This proposition means that our result is the same as that of quantity-setting market 
games obtained by Poyago-Theotoky (2001). 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
  We have investigated the role that production subsidies play in a price-setting duopoly 
comprising a public firm and a private firm. We have cons
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regimes: (i) the public firm moves simultaneously with the private firm, (ii) the public 
firm acts as a Stackelberg leader, and (iii) both firms behave as profit-maximizers. We 
have found that the optimal subsidy, prices, outputs, profits, consumer surplus and 
economic welfare are identical in all three games. 
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